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Community Reinvestment Act Final Rule: Will the 
FDIC Eventually Adopt the New Regulations? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1977, Congress stated that banks have continuing and 
affirmative obligations to help meet the credit needs of local 
communities, especially low-and moderate-income (“LMI”) 
neighborhoods where they are chartered, in a manner consistent with the 
safe and sound operations of the institutions.1  Congress came to this idea 
based on previous chartering laws requiring banks to demonstrate that 
their facilities serve the convenience and needs of their community, LMI 
neighborhoods, and credit and deposit services.2   
The Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) was enacted in an 
attempt to ensure that insured depository institutions satisfy their 
obligations to meet the credit needs of their entire community; 
specifically LMI neighborhoods.3  The CRA requires the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”), and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
(“FRB”) to use periodic “performance evaluations” to assess the 
performance of depository institutions in fulfilling these obligations.4  
The OCC oversees nationally chartered banks and federal savings 
associations, the FRB oversees state chartered banks that are members of 
the Federal Reserve System (“FRS”), and the FDIC oversees insured state 
banks that are not members of the FRS.5 
 
1. See e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., History of the CRA (Dec. 7, 
2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerscommunities/cra_history.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6FBY-HZYF] [hereinafter FED. RES.];  Community Reinvestment Act, 12 
U.S.C. § 2901 (2012) (describing all the changes made to help the credit needs of LMI 
neighborhoods); Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 34734, 34758 
(June 5, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 25 and 195) (explaining banks’ continuing and 
affirmative obligations to LMI neighborhoods). 
2. Id. 
3. See 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (mandating financial institutions to “help meet the credit needs of 
the local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation 
of such institutions”). 
4. Community Reinvestment Act: Background & Purpose, FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION 
COUNSEL (Sept. 6, 2018, 5:52 PM), https://www.ffiec.gov/cra/history.htm 
[https://perma.cc/25C4-FMTV]. 
5. Id. 
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In October of 2020, the OCC adopted a final rule that modified 
how regulators rate banks on their community reinvestment efforts.6  This 
rule created a more objective and transparent standard for evaluating a 
bank’s community reinvestment performance.7  In addition to providing 
a more objective standard, the rule encourages banks to invest, lend, and 
provide more loans to their respective communities and LMI 
neighborhoods.8 
Beginning in 2021, the CRA will proscribe that 80% of banks will 
be subject to the FDIC and FRB regulatory regime, while the other 20% 
will be subject to the OCC regulatory regime.9  The FDIC originally 
signaled its agreement with the OCC’s December 2019 Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking by engaging in a joint-rulemaking session with its 
fellow agency.10  The FDIC has since stated at the end of 2020 that it 
should not go through with the rulemaking during the COVID-19 
pandemic.11  Since, in the end, only the OCC adopted the new rule, but 
not the FDIC or FRB, only nationally chartered banks must adhere to this 
rule.12  This could lead to opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, since 
state chartered banks do not have to adhere to this rule.13   
The OCC’s new rule, effective October 1, 2020 sounds promising 
on its face, but does it actually achieve the goals that it desires?14  In some 
ways it certainly does; the rule increases credit for mortgage origination 
in an attempt to increase the availability of affordable mortgages in LMI 
areas, and it increases support for small businesses, as well as small and 
 
6. See generally Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 34734 (June 5, 
2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 25 and 195) (explaining all of the provisions of the final 
rule). 
7. Joseph Otting, The Final CRA Rule Is In. Here’s Why It’s Better, AM. BANKER (May 20, 
2020, 8:02 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/the-final-cra-rule-is-in-heres-
why-its-better [https://perma.cc/7C5D-NAMF].  
8. Id. 
9. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34739. 
10. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 1204 (proposed Jan. 9, 2020) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 345). 
11. Id. 
12. Laurie Goodman et al., The OCC’s Final CRA Rule Improves Upon the Proposed Rule 





14. See generally Scott Coleman et al., The OCC’s Final CRA Rule: What Changed from 
the Agency’s Proposed Rule?, JD SUPRA (June 15, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-occ-s-final-cra-rule-what-changed-62599/ 
[https://perma.cc/E4UU-E8JV] (outlining major changes from the CRA and explaining in 
detail what they attempt to accomplish). 
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family-owned farms.15  However, in some ways it came up short—there 
was no evidence of the proposed rule’s impact on LMI areas and there is 
still uncertainty as to how effective the new final rule will be in assessing 
banks.16 
This Note addresses whether the OCC’s final rule actually 
accomplishes the goals it desires and whether the FDIC will eventually 
adopt this new policy.  Part II explains the history and development of 
the CRA and how banks have been evaluated under it in the past.17  Part 
III examines whether the final rule accomplishes the goals it desires by 
weighing the support of the final rule against the critiques.18  Part IV 
concludes by discussing whether the FDIC will eventually adopt these 
new regulations.19 
II.  CRA HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 
Congress passed the CRA in 1977 to require the OCC, FRB, and 
FDIC to examine financial institutions and encourage them to help meet 
the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered, as 
well as LMI neighborhoods.20  Since its passage in 1977, the CRA has 
been periodically updated in order to provide more objective standards 
and resolve financial and economic issues during the relevant time 
period.21  In 1989, the CRA was modified to require regulators to provide 
more detailed written evaluations, publicly disclose CRA results, and 
establish a tiered rating system.22  
In 1991, the FDIC Improvement Act (“FDICIA”) strengthened 
the role of the FDIC by giving it an increased role in overseeing banks 
 
15. See generally Otting, supra note 7 (explaining how an increase in credit for mortgage 
origination positively affects LMI households).  
16. Goodman, supra note 12. 
17. See infra Part II. 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (2012); see also 12 U.S.C. § 
2903(a)(2) (2012) (explaining the examination process when evaluating a bank’s CRA 
performance). 
21. FED. RES., supra note 1.  
22. The CRA temporarily created the Resolution Trust Corp. in an attempt to help the 
nation's failed savings and loan institutions.  In addition, the CRA abolished the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, as well as created the Savings Association 
Insurance Fund and the Bank Insurance Fund.  Regulations were also finalized to make sure 
that real estate appraisals are performed to a certain standard, including requirements for 
adequate training of appraisers and of their supervisors. See 12 U.S.C. § 2906 (2012) 
(describing all other changes that were made to the CRA at this time). 
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and protecting consumers.23  Congress enacted the FDICIA as a response 
to the Savings and Loan Crisis—an event that caused the failure of nearly 
a third of the U.S. savings and loan associations by 1995.24  The FDICIA 
created the Truth in Savings Act, which requires banks to provide 
disclosures regarding savings account interest rates, allowing consumers 
the ability to compare products offered by different banks so that they 
have more information.25   
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act of 1994 requires separate CRA performance assessments in every 
state where a bank has an actual physical presence.26  It also requires an 
agency to evaluate an out-of-state national bank's CRA rating or a state 
bank's CRA rating when deciding whether to allow banks to build 
interstate branches.27  
In 1995, the CRA regulations were updated in an attempt to 
account for an institution’s size and business operations.28  The updates 
in 1995 instituted three “performance tests.”29  First, the Lending Test, 
which is the most heavily weighted in terms of a bank’s CRA rating, rates 
institutions on the number, amount, and distribution of loans across 
different geographic neighborhoods and income groups.30  Second, the 
 
23. 12 U.S.C. § 1811(a) (2010). 
24. Julia Kagan, FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA), INVESTOPEDIA (July 16, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federal-deposit-insurance-corporation-improvement-
act-fdicia.asp [https://perma.cc/7JRM-GTQR]; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (outlining all of the 
changes made to the FDICIA). 
25. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811(b)(3) (explaining how this act requires financial institutions with 
over $500 million in consolidated assets to go through extremely thorough financial audits 
and be in accordance with additional annual reporting requirements. Financial institutions that 
fail to comply with FDICIA requirements would face civil penalties and additional actions 
from regulators). 
26. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(d). 
27. Bill Medley, Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 
FED. RES. HIST., https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/riegle_neal_act_of_1994 
[https://perma.cc/5EH3-GRSJ] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020). 
28. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22156, 22156 (July 1, 
1995) (“The final rule seeks to emphasize performance rather than process, to promote 
consistency in evaluations, and to eliminate unnecessary burden.  As compared to the 1993 
and 1994 proposals, the final rule reduces recordkeeping and reporting requirements and 
makes other modifications and clarifications.”); see also Sandra F. Braunstein,, The 
Community Reinvestment Act, FED. RES.  (Feb. 13, 2008), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/braunstein20080213a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/R2ZB-84H3] (explaining the details of the 1995 changes to the CRA). 
29. John Alexander et al., Effects of Revisions to the CRA in 1995 on Regulatory 
Enforcement, 7 J. OF BUS. AND ECON. RES. 1 (2009). 
30. SANDRA F. BRAUNSTEIN, DIR., DIV. OF CONSUMER AND CMTY. AFFS., THE COMMUNITY 
REINVESTMENT ACT (Feb. 13, 2008), 
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Investment Test examines how well the institution meets the needs of the 
local communities by making community investments.31  Lastly, the 
Service Test evaluates the ability of the institution to meet the credit 
needs of the community and LMI neighborhoods through its retail service 
delivery system.32  This was the first time that these tests were used for 
evaluating a bank’s CRA rating.33  The determinations of these tests also 
introduced asset size thresholds to define whether a bank would be 
considered a small or large bank, thereby subjecting them to different 
regulations.34 
In 2005, the CRA’s regulations were updated to adjust the asset 
size thresholds35 for small and large banks depending on what the 
Consumer Price Index (“CPI”) proscribes.36  The  CPI is an index that 
measures the average change over time in prices paid by urban consumers 
for a market basket of consumer goods and services.37  The CRA 
regulations added an intermediate small bank category to classify 
institutions by size, and it expanded the definition of community 
development to broaden the geographic areas where activities can qualify 
for CRA recognition.38   
Other efforts to update the regulation occurred in 2018, including 
attempts to make receiving CRA credit clearer and more transparent.39  
Updates also extended the CRA examination cycle for some banks and 
reduced the amount of discretion that examiners possess in deciding 
whether to evaluate banks under a full or limited scope examination.40 
As of today, performance evaluations are based on two criteria: 
(1) whether a bank is a nationally chartered bank or a state-chartered bank 
and (2) a consideration of the size of the bank.41  Large banks with assets 




31. Alexander et al., supra note 29, at 2. 
32. BRAUNSTEIN, supra note 30. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at n.1. 
35. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 83,747, 83,747 (Dec. 23, 
2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, 345) (explaining how the size of a bank’s assets 
will consider them a “small institution”, “intermediate small institution”, or “large 
institution”). 
36. 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(u) (2012). 
37. Consumer Price Index, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/cpi/ 
[https://perma.cc/CT4S-LMLL] (last visited Feb. 2, 2021). 
38. § 228.12(u). 
39. FED. RES, supra note 1. 
40. Id. 
41. 12 C.F.R. § 25 (2020). 
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consisting of the Lending Test, Service Test, and Investment Test.42  Both 
large and small banks are subject to the Lending Test, which evaluates 
the number and monetary amount of home mortgage, small farm, small 
business, and consumer loans with all of the income levels in the bank’s 
assessment area.43  The Service Test examines the availability and 
effectiveness of a bank’s retail banking services and how they give 
community development services in their assessment areas.44  Finally, the 
Investment Test weighs the investment’s complexity, dollar amount, and 
its benefit to the assessment area.45  It also assesses the likelihood that 
private investors will provide investments and gives an inferior grade 
depending on the size of the private investors’ contribution.46 
CRA ratings are made by the summation of points received on 
the three tests (Lending, Investment, and Services Tests).47  Regulators, 
like the OCC and FDIC, use these ratings when pondering a bank’s 
application to expand facilities, relocate an office, open up new branches, 
and merge with other banks.48  In addition to these requirements, a bank’s 
CRA rating must be satisfactory or better to establish a financial 
subsidiary.49  If a bank receives a CRA rating below satisfactory and 
already has financial subsidiaries, it cannot commence any additional 
activity or acquire control of any company until they receive a 
satisfactory CRA rating.50  Additionally, a bank holding company’s 
depository institution’s subsidiaries must have a CRA rating of 
satisfactory or above for the bank holding company to ask the FRB to 
treat it as a financial holding company.51  If the bank holding company is 







47. Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Questions and Answers, OFF. OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/consumers-and-
communities/cra/cra-questions-and-answers.html [https://perma.cc/Z3W7-GG2Q] (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
48. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(2) (2018). 
49. 12 U.S.C. § 24(a)(7); see also 12 C.F.R. § 208.75 (2020) (defining a financial 
subsidiary and its features). 
50. 12 C.F.R. § 208.75(a) (2020); see also 12 C.F.R. § 208.75(a)(2) (2020) (explaining 
how a CRA grade generally works). 
51. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(2) (explaining how a bank holding company can become a 
financial holding company). 
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of activities, undoubtedly a strong incentive for banks to obtain a 
satisfactory or above rating.52  
III.  DOES THE CRA ACCOMPLISH ITS GOALS 
A.         Criticisms of the CRA 
Many critics find the CRA requirements vague and have asked 
for more clear and concise guidelines to determine what constitutes an 
acceptable means of reinvesting into the community and LMI 
neighborhoods.53  Critics frequently disagree over what should receive 
CRA credit.54  Many argue that the standard is too subjective. Sometimes 
loans or investments do not count as CRA credit even though most would 
say that credit is warranted given that such loans and investments will 
positively impact local communities and LMI neighborhoods.55 
The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (“NCRC”) and 
American Bankers Association (“ABA”) disagree about small business 
lending and whether it should be considered for community development 
credit.56  The ABA argues that loans to small businesses and nonprofits 
with an actual purpose of community development should be considered 
community development loans, so the CRA rating can correctly measure 
the impact that banks have in their assessment areas.57  On the other hand, 
the NCRC claims that “doing so would double count small business loans 
and inflate the Lending Test rate.”58   
 
52. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (listing the broad array of financial activities that financial 
holding companies are permitted to engage in). 
53. Letter from Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., to Comptroller 
Otting and Chairman McWilliams, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Apr. 8, 2020), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102005/community-reinvestment-act-
april-8-2020-comment-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/PMW2-2RNB] [hereinafter Letter from 
Robert Feldman].  
54. Goodman, et al., supra note 12. 
55. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 81 Fed. Reg. 48,506, 48,506 (July 25, 
2016) (describing the confusion of the subjectiveness of the CRA). 
56. Letter from John Taylor, President and CEO of the Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., to 
Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y of the Treasury (Feb. 5, 2018), https://ncrc.org/letter-to-treasury/ 
[https://perma.cc/RX5Z-HPHZ]. 
57.Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Questions and Answers, OFF. OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/consumers-and-
communities/cra/cra-questions-and-answers.html [https://perma.cc/Z3W7-GG2Q] (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
58. Letter from John Taylor, supra note 56. 
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Critics of CRA also argue that it addresses a nonexistent 
problem.59  They argue that the issues occurring in credit markets are 
inadequate to justify intervention and that the CRA is the wrong policy 
to effect those changes even if intervention is warranted.60  Earlier 
research found that the CRA did not have a positive effect on credit 
markets and that the policies came at a high cost.61  For example, ten years 
ago, corporate law professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, tried 
to demonstrate the weak effects and high cost of the CRA in response to 
changes made to the Act in 1989.62  They explained that the CRA is 
unjustified, threatens the safety and soundness of the banking system, and 
encourages community groups to seek out cheaper rent, only at the cost 
of banks’ profitability.63  It is further argued that the CRA actually 
provides little benefit to LMI neighborhoods and is costly because it 
makes banks give unprofitable and risky loans to people with low credit 
scores.64  Compliance costs are also high for these loans.65  Critics believe 
that there are other alternatives that can overcome these market failures, 
help lessen credit discrimination, and provide funds to help LMI 
neighborhoods.66 
B.         Changes Made by the Final Rule 
The final rule’s updates could generally fit into four categories.67  
First, it clarifies which bank activities qualify for positive CRA 
consideration.68  The rule defines a “qualifying activity” as an activity 
that helps meet the credit needs of a bank’s entire community, including 
LMI neighborhoods.69   Qualifying activities include retail loans, 
 
59. See Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and 
Its Critics, 80 N. Y. U. L. REV. 513 (2005) at 519 (explaining that although he is arguing in 
favor of the CRA, other critics suggest that it is unnecessary to change it) (emphasis added). 
60. Id. at 527. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 527–28. 
63. Id. 
64. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 81 Fed. Reg. 48506 (July 25, 2016) 
(codified at 12 C.F.R. 25.26) (describing the concerns of how the CRA will actually help LMI 
neighborhoods) (emphasis added). 
65. Barr, supra note 59, at 519. 
66. Id. 
67. See generally Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 34734 (June 5, 
2020) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 25 and 12 C.F.R. 195) (discussing all the changes that have been 
made to the final rule). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 34735. 
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community development loans, community development investments, 
and community development services.70  The OCC released a 
comprehensive list to make the standard for what is considered a 
“qualifying activity” more objective.71  
The second area of change is redefining how banks delineate the 
assessment areas in which they are evaluated based on changes to 
banking business models over the past twenty-five years.72  The prior 
regulatory framework only considered physical branches as the basis for 
delineating a bank’s CRA assessment areas (“Facility-Based Assessment 
Areas”).73  The OCC acknowledged this standard no longer correctly 
reflects the manner in which many banks conduct their business, 
recognizing that many banks receive deposits from customers residing in 
areas not contiguous with the bank’s physical facilities.74  The rule 
requires a bank that receives 50% or more of its retail domestic deposits 
from areas outside its own Facility-Based Assessment Areas to have 
separate deposit-based assessment areas in places where it acquires 5% 
or more of its total domestic deposits.75  Despite this realization, the rule 
provides that an ATM does not constitute a “non-branch deposit-taking 
facility” for the purpose of delineating a Facility-Based Assessment Area 
wherever a bank has a main office, branch, or non-branch deposit-taking 
facility.76  Banks can also change their assessment areas once per year.77   
 
70. Id. 
71. See CRA Illustrative List of Qualifying Activities, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, DEPARTMENT OF TREAS. (2020), https://www.occ.gov/topics/consumers-and-
communities/cra/cra-qualifying-activities.pdf. [https://perma.cc/M325-BW95] (showing all 
of the activities that “qualify” under the new regime); see also Community Reinvestment Act 
Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34735 (defining “qualifying activity”). 
72. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 34734, 34735 (explaining 
all of the changes made to assessment areas based on online transactions, as well as in-person 
transactions). 
73. Debevoise & Plimpton, OCC Finalizes Rule Intended to Strengthen and Modernize 






74. Id. at 5. 
75. COVINGTON, OCC ISSUES FINAL RULE REVISING COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 
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The third general category of changes is articulating more 
objective standards for evaluating banks’ CRA performances.78  This 
includes incorporating a process for banks to petition the OCC to add a 
new activity to the list of qualifying activities that receive credit under 
the CRA.79  The OCC’s final rule also includes in its list of qualifying 
activities certain categories of economic development activities that 
currently qualify for CRA credit, showing how these updates do not 
deviate entirely from the regulatory framework that was previously 
used.80  Qualifying activities that were the main source of criticism by 
communities, neighborhoods, and certain members of Congress—
including investing money into the construction of a stadium, or 
benefiting opportunity zones—must directly benefit LMI neighborhoods 
in order to receive credit as a “qualifying activity.”81  The rule also 
permits activities that would have received CRA credit in the previous 
evaluation periods to continue to get the same credit under the new 
regulations, even if they are not specifically stated in the rule’s list of 
qualifying activities.82 
The rule’s fourth and final requirement mandates more 
transparent and timely reporting.83  The OCC found that the CRA 
performance evaluations can be difficult to navigate and use. 84  It can 
also be onerous to make comparisons from one bank to another, or from 
one bank’s evaluation to its other evaluations.85  The rule also gives credit 
to a bank that originates and sells a loan within 365 days of origination in 
the amount of the loan at its inception.86  Previously, a bank only received 
credit when it originated and sold a loan within ninety days of origination, 
so this update made it much easier to receive credit in this regard.87  A 
bank may also request confirmation from the OCC that an area is 
considered a “CRA desert.”88  
 
78. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 34734, 34769 (June 5, 2020) 
(codified at 12 C.F.R. 25 and 12 C.F.R. 195). 




83. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34737. 
84. Debevoise & Plimpton, supra note 73, at 9. 
85. Id. 
86. COVINGTON, supra note 75, at 5. 
87. Goodman, et al., supra note 12, at 4. 
88. COVINGTON, supra note 75, at 5; see also Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 
85 Fed. Reg. at 34747 (explaining that a “CRA desert” is considered an area that experiences 
lower than expected levels of lending and investments). 
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C.         Support and Critique of the Final Rule 
Although the OCC’s final rule is certainly not perfect, it attempts 
to fix prior issues that agencies had with the CRA in many ways.89  
Previously, banks would have only received 25% credit for loans sold 
within ninety days.90  Under the new rule, banks will get credit for an 
entire 100% of origination value for loans sold during the year the loan 
was originated.91  This change primarily targets single-family mortgage 
lenders, where many LMI loans are sold.92 
There is generally better support for low-income families and 
small businesses in the new proposal.93  The rule increased support to 
small business, small and family-owned farms, Native American 
territories, and distressed areas by using the “CRA desert” classification, 
while also accommodating banks of all business models and sizes by 
adjusting their asset size thresholds.94  This adjustment was accomplished 
by both requiring banks to fund such communities in greater capacity, as 
well as adding greater incentives to do so.95  Since there is now a 
comprehensive list, there is finally more clarity in what qualifies for CRA 
consideration under the OCC’s final rule.96  Additionally, the rule 
updated how banks define assessment areas by maintaining immediate 
geographies around branches and establishing more assessment areas for 
smaller banks that do not rely on branch networks to meet the needs of 
their customers.97 
Regulators are able to evaluate bank CRA performance more 
objectively through quantitative measures that measure the value and 
volume of bank activities.98  Some have argued that the CRA gave limited 
evaluations to some banks, so the update requires regulators to 
thoroughly evaluate banks’ CRA performance in all their assessment 
 
89. See generally Letter from Robert Feldman, supra note 53 (describing the positive 
attempts the final rule makes to making a more objective standard). 
90. Goodman, et al., supra note 12, at 3. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller of the Currency 
Highlights Final Rule Strengthening and Modernizing the Community Reinvestment Act 
(May 20, 2020), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2020/nr-occ-2020-
64.html [https://perma.cc/2J23-V9ED] [hereinafter OCC Press Release]. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. CRA Illustrative List of Qualifying Activities, supra note 71, at 1. 
97. OCC Press Release, supra note 93. 
98. Id. 
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areas.99  However, the OCC has deferred setting thresholds for assessing 
banks' CRA performance until the agency can review and understand this 
improved data.100  The rule also required regulators to consider 
performance context, discrimination, and illegal credit 
activity before assigning their final ratings.101   
Despite all these advantages, the FDIC did not adopt the rule due 
to its many critiques.102 Additionally, there were complications with 
finalizing this rule during the COVID-19 pandemic.103  There was no 
evidence of the proposed rule’s impact.104  Public data would be lost, 
while bank reporting burdens would increase.105  Furthermore, there is no 
data indicating that the new rule will take a step towards making 
standards more objective or make a bigger impact than the previous 
regulations.106   
The primary metric used for assessing CRA compliance also 
neglected community needs.107  The bank-level CRA evaluation metric 
emphasized the evaluation of banks’ activities on its bank-wide balance 
sheet that displays “CRA-eligible activities,” rather than the investments 
and loans made to serve LMI neighborhoods.108  The rule created limited 
and, at times, unforgiving testing on retail and community development 
lending, with a limit on community coverage.109  Since banks would be 
tested only for retail lines with at least 15% of the bank’s retail activities, 
some large banks that do almost all of their business in one retail line 
would not be evaluated on other lines because one retail line consisted of 
more than 85% of their retail lending.110   
There are modernization issues with the rule as well, namely a 
huge time lag between examination and the issuance of exam reports.111  





102. Krista Shonk, Three Takeaways from CRA Modernization, ABA BANKING J. (July 9, 
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to the COVID-19 pandemic). 
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issued in 2013, severely limiting the reports’ functionality for both banks 
and their communities.112  Moreover, there are still communities—
especially those with a large number of online banks—where the amount 
of money available for CRA-eligible investments is high, generally 
exceeding the actual needs of the community (“CRA hotspots”).113  This 
is an issue because there are CRA deserts where there is not enough 
money available to meet the needs of their community.114 
Finally, there is uncertainty as to what counts, particularly when 
discussing community development loans and investments.115  This lack 
of clarity could lead to fewer investments that actually respond to 
community needs and could eventually lead to less investment overall.116  
The examination process not only varies from regulator to regulator, but 
within each individual agency.117  Previously, all three agencies followed 
the same set of rules.118  
As of October 2020, the OCC has adopted its final rule; the FRB 
is working on a different rule; and the FDIC is still subject to the former 
rule.119  This has led to confusion for banks as to what set of regulations 
they must abide by, while the chance of regulatory arbitrage has 
increased.120  The OCC also has way more bank assets under its 
jurisdiction, so it can be viewed as having the most influential force 
among the three regulators, which could lead to even more confusion.121  
The OCC controls a higher percentage of overall banks as well, so the 
agency has the most power out of all the bank regulators over all the 
banks in the United States.122  These uncertainties could potentially 
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include superficial examinations of a bank’s community development 
activity in many of their assessment areas.123  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
A.         Why Didn’t the FDIC Adopt the Final Rule? 
The general consensus seems to be that the OCC’s final rule was 
rushed.124  “This final 372-page set of rules came just six weeks after the 
close of the public comment period, a record-breaking pace, and a day 
before Comptroller Otting resigned from the agency.”125  Many 
commenters seemed distressed that the OCC’s final rule was finalized 
during the COVID-19 pandemic and claim that it will harm many 
communities suffering from the pandemic.126  However, it is important to 
note that some people believe that the pandemic is a reason to accelerate 
the need for the rule.127  Comptroller Otting stated, “[t]he [COVID-19] 
pandemic has only made it more dire that communities—particularly 
[LMI] neighborhoods—need more capital and better access to credit. And 
they need it now."128   
The timing was also not right for the FDIC to ask small 
community banks to meet new regulatory requirements.129  Bank officials 
emphatically agreed with this idea because they were concerned that they 
do not have the necessary tools and time to implement changes to their 
CRA operations while they are trying to deal with the small-business 
lending program and other issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic.130  
The rule has also become increasingly political.131  The House 
Democrats were much more willing to pass the regulations as opposed to 
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the House Republicans, which are largely symbolic of the pandemic and 
social issues.132  The rule is becoming more of a social issue as racial 
inequity is underlined by protests over George Floyd’s death in 
Minneapolis police custody, so the FDIC was hesitant to adopt the rule 
out of a desire to placate concerns over social issues, rather than to meet 
a need for updates.133 
B.         Will the FDIC Eventually Adopt the Final Rule? 
When asked if the FDIC will eventually adopt the final rule, the 
consensus among most commentators appears to be, “yes.”134  The FDIC 
was originally supposed to adopt the regulations with the OCC, but 
dropped the proposed regulations at the end due to the aforementioned 
reasons.135  Since the FDIC controls state-chartered banks and the OCC 
controls nationally chartered banks, this has created opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage and also created a separation between state and 
nationally chartered banks.136  Since the goal of the OCC and the FDIC 
is the same in this matter, a solution will likely be worked out in order to 
maintain consistency.137   
The OCC’s proposed rule made specific numeric thresholds that 
banks would be subject to in different aspects of the general performance 
standards, including the CRA Evaluation Measure, the Community 
Development Minimum, and the Retail Lending Distribution Tests.138  
The OCC omitted key numeric thresholds in the final rule, stating that it 
had not done enough research to justify these thresholds.139  Instead, the 
OCC will continue to gather data on what thresholds are appropriate and 
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Once numeric thresholds are put in place, the FDIC is more likely to join 
the OCC’s rulemaking.141  
“The rule also does not specify how (or whether) the OCC will 
evaluate a bank’s CRA performance between the time of its last 
evaluation under the previous CRA rules and the date of the rule.”142  If 
more specific information becomes available as to how a bank’s CRA 
performance will be evaluated before the compliance date of the final 
rule, the FDIC would be more ready to accept the regulations.143  An 
argument can be made that banks should not be held to standards that 
they do not understand, and the FDIC does not want to waste time and 
resources in instructing all of its examiners to evaluate banks based on 
whatever standard should be applied.144  
The FDIC was also hesitant to adopt the regulations due to it 
being rushed by the OCC.145  The COVID-19 pandemic played into this 
decision, as some argued that it needed to be rushed out, despite not being 
completely ready.146  The FDIC may be willing to join the OCC once the 
pandemic’s economic effect stabilizes.147  The OCC will also have 
additional time to judge the efficacy of their new rules.148 
The FDIC did not think it would be wise to impose new CRA 
standards on small community banks to meet the new standard since there 
are many issues that small banks must deal with just to stay afloat during 
the COVID-19 pandemic.149  However, once the pandemic ends, there 
will be fewer burdens on small community banks, so the FDIC may be 
more willing to adopt the OCC’s CRA rule.150 
Just as the pandemic pushed the FDIC to hold out on adopting the 
rule, the same can be said about the political concerns of racial 
inequality.151  The importance of such a social movement cannot be put 
into words.152  However, the FDIC does not want to finalize a rule 
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affecting all state nonmember banks as a reaction to the movement.153  
Since the FDIC felt that the rule was rushed and that it had been finalized 
in an attempt to seek social justice, it did not sign off and instead wanted 
to give more time for many of the issues in the rule to be addressed.154  
Essentially, the FDIC may think it would be a good idea to adopt the rule 
if modifications are made to the existing rule.155  Letting time pass will 
be the best way to allow the FDIC to adopt the regulations in a way that 
they feel is not rushed.156 
Although the FDIC may think it would be a good idea to 
eventually adopt the final rule, the FRB may not have the same 
thoughts.157  Since the OCC’s final rule was passed, the FRB issued an 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPR”) that also attempts to 
modify the prior CRA regulations.158  However, these updates do not 
exactly match the updates of the OCC’s final rule. The updates show that 
the FRB may not join the FDIC in potentially adopting the OCC’s final 
rule if the FDIC ultimately decides to do so.159  
Although the ANPR matches the final rule in the non-exhaustive 
list of qualifying activities and expanding deposit-based assessment 
areas, it differs from the OCC’s final rule in that it focuses more on 
addressing inequities in credit access, ensuring an inclusive financial 
services industry, and minimizing the reporting burden on regulators.160  
This is a shift from the final rule’s focus on objective standards to be met 
for evaluating a bank’s CRA performance.161  Federal Reserve Board 
Governor Lael Brainard showed her dissatisfaction with the passage of 
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right than to do it quickly.”162  This also feeds the theory that letting time 
pass to allow modifications to be made to the final rule could entice the 
FDIC to eventually adopt the final rule.163 
It may be likely that the FRB will not adopt the final rule and will 
instead focus on making their own CRA regulations.164  This stance by 
the FRB will have a significant impact on the FDIC’s adoption of the 
final rule, since the FRB’s willingness to create their own CRA 
regulations may motivate the FDIC to do the same.165  This would not 
help the OCC in its attempt to create a uniform system for evaluating 
CRA standards.166 Additionally, this would create an apparent ridge 
between the standards of nationally chartered banks and state chartered 
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